PART I: From Unmet Expectations to A 78% Performance Score
By Marcus Bangura
In January 2025, I questioned whether President Julius Maada Bio’s Ministerial Performance Contract initiative was a genuine instrument of democratic accountability or another ambitious governance reform destined to fade into administrative obscurity.
TWO YEARS AFTER THE PROMISE, THE ACCOUNTABILITY QUESTION REMAINS
In my C4D Media article, “Unmet Expectations… Maada Bio’s Ministerial Performance Contract in Limbo,” I raised concerns about implementation, the absence of clearly communicated enforcement measures, and whether ministers would face consequences for failing to meet agreed targets.
Nearly two years later, the issue deserves renewed scrutiny.
In March 2026, published reports indicated that the government had released its 2025 Ministerial Performance Contract Report, recording an overall performance score of 78 per cent. According to those accounts, 62 per cent of targets were fully achieved, 22 per cent partially achieved, and 16 per cent not achieved.
The publication of these results demonstrates that the assessment process has continued. It would therefore be inaccurate to declare the initiative dead.
But an important question remains: Beyond contracts, evaluations and performance scores, where is the evidence that ministerial accountability is being enforced?
That is the question President Bio’s government must answer.
FROM A BOLD PROMISE TO A TEST OF CREDIBILITY
Introduced in 2024, the ministerial performance contracts were intended to strengthen results-oriented governance by linking ministers’ responsibilities to specific targets and government priorities.
The framework sought to promote accountability in policy implementation, public service delivery, financial management, procurement compliance and the implementation of audit recommendations.
The principle is sound. Ministers entrusted with public resources must demonstrate what they have achieved, explain what they have failed to deliver and account for their stewardship.
However, as I argued in January 2025, the initiative’s credibility depends on the government’s willingness and capacity to enforce its requirements.
A contract that establishes targets without effective follow-through risks becoming a bureaucratic exercise. Conversely, transparent assessments, credible verification and appropriate corrective measures can make performance contracts meaningful instruments of accountability.
The difference lies not in signing the contracts, but in what happens afterwards.
THE 78% SCORE: PROGRESS, BUT WHAT DOES IT PROVE?
The reported 78 per cent performance score deserves serious consideration. However, an overall figure cannot, by itself, establish whether citizens have experienced meaningful improvements in public services or whether underperforming ministers have been held accountable.
The public needs access to the evidence behind the assessment.
Did improvements in administrative compliance translate into better services? Were weaknesses identified in underperforming ministries corrected? Were audit recommendations implemented? Were reported achievements independently verified?
These questions are essential because performance measurement should serve the public interest, not merely demonstrate that an evaluation has been completed.
A government can report progress in its performance management system, but citizens must be able to determine what that progress means in practice.
The 78 per cent score should therefore be treated as a starting point for scrutiny, not the final verdict on ministerial performance.
THE REAL TEST: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN MINISTERS FAIL?
The reported assessment indicated that 16 per cent of targets were not achieved, while another 22 per cent were only partially achieved.
These figures do not automatically establish incompetence or misconduct. Some targets may have been affected by resource limitations, implementation challenges or circumstances beyond a ministry’s control.
Nevertheless, the reported figures raise legitimate questions about ministerial responsibility and corrective action:
· Were ministers required to explain why they failed to meet their targets?
· Were improvement plans introduced with clear deadlines?
· Were outstanding commitments reviewed, and was progress subsequently verified?
· What consequences follow when a minister repeatedly fails to meet agreed targets without a satisfactory explanation?
The objective should not be to demand the dismissal of every minister who misses a target. Fair performance management requires an assessment of the circumstances and an opportunity to correct genuine weaknesses.
However, where persistent underperformance is established, the government must demonstrate that the process leads to meaningful action.
Without such evidence, citizens may reasonably question whether performance contracts are changing ministerial behaviour or merely documenting it.
CONCLUSION: THE REPORT IS NOT THE FINAL VERDICT
The publication of the 2025 performance assessment is significant because it shows that the evaluation process has continued since the concerns raised in January 2025.
However, publication alone cannot settle the accountability debate. The decisive issues are what deficiencies were identified, what corrective measures followed, whether those measures were implemented and how persistent underperformance was addressed.
This leads to the central question examined in Part Two:
If the contracts are alive and assessments are taking place, what mechanisms ensure that ministers are held accountable for their results, or their failures?
Part Two examines enforcement, audit compliance, transparency and the political will required to turn ministerial performance contracts into a credible instrument of public accountability.
TO BE CONTINUED IN PART TWO.
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